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1. Princess Peach is a character from the highly popular video game
franchise, Mario Bros. See Rus McLaughlin, IGN Presents: The History of Super Mario
Bros., IGN (Sept. 13, 2010), http://www.ign.com/articles/20I0/09/14/ign
-presents-the-history-of-super-mario-bros?. At the game's inception, Princess Peach
served as an object for the hero, Mario, to rescue from the villain, Bowser. Id.
f JD Candidate, William Mitchell College of Law, 2016.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of
the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more
enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed,
and manners and opinions change with the change of
circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep pace
with the times.2
-Thomas Jefferson
In United States v. Reichert, the Sixth Circuit upheld Jeffrey
Reichert's criminal conviction for willfully trafficking in video game
modification chips in violation of §§ 1201 and 1204 of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). 3 On appeal, the court found
that the contested, deliberate ignorance jury instruction did not
constitute a reversible error.4 Although correctly decided based on
existing law, Reichert highlights new concerns and issues regarding
criminal prosecution under the DMCA.
Part II of this case note presents a concise history of the
DMCA5 followed by an examination of §§ 12016 and 1204' of the
DMCA. Part III discusses Reichert's facts and procedure,8 holding,9
and dissent.'0 Part IV analyzes Reichert" and discusses its effects on
consumer rights. 12 Part V concludes that courts should reject
Reichert's relaxed treatment of § 1204's mens rea element.
13
II. COPYRIGHT LAW
United States copyright law is rooted in the Constitution's
mandate "to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive
2. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in 15
THE WRITINGS OF THOMASJEFFERSON 41 (A. Lipscomb & A. Bergh eds., 1905).
3. 747 F.3d 445, 448 (6th Cir. 2014).
4. Id. at 447-48.
5. See infra Part II.A.
6. See infra Part II.B.
7. See infra Part II.C.
8. See infra Part III.A.
9. See infra Part III.B.
10. See infra Part III.C.
11. See infra Part IV.A.
12. See infra Part 1V.B.
13. See infra Part V.
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right to their respective writings and discoveries."' 4 Under the
federal copyright regime, authors are granted, for a limited time, a
collection of exclusive rights in their "original works of authorship
fixed in a tangible medium of expression. '' 5 The owner of a
copyrighted work has the exclusive right to reproduce; prepare
derivative works; distribute; display; and in the case of sound
recordings, the right to perform the copyrighted work via digital
audio transmission.'6 Copyright does not exist to merely reward the
author for her labors." The true underlying goal of copyright is to
provide the quantum of protection necessary to encourage authors
to create and disseminate new, original works. 
s
A. History of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
Traditionally, the United States federal copyright regime has
taken a "technology neutral" approach-regulating the use of
works rather than devices or means used to access them.'9 However,
the digital revolution of the late twentieth century and its disruptive
impact20 on the production and consumption of copyrighted
material prompted content industries to urge Congress to amend
the copyright statute.2' Accordingly, Congress enacted the DMCA
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
15. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
16. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(6).
17. See, e.g., Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 359-60
(1991) (rejecting "sweat of the brow" justification for copyright).
18. See Kenneth L. Port, Forward: Symposium on Intellectual Property Law Theory,
68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 585, 587 (1993).
19. H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 24 (1998). But see INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE
TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS 11 n.23 (1995) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER], available at http://www
.nspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/ipnii/ipnii.pdf (discussing the Audio Home
Recording Act as an example of a law that combines "legal and technological"
restrictions to advance consumers' and copyright owners' interests).
20. See, e.g., WHITE PAPER, supra note 19, at 12 ("The emergence of integrated
information technology is dramatically changing, and will continue to change,
how people and businesses deal in and with information and information
products ....").
21. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act Section 104 Report: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, & Intellectual Prop. of the Comm. on the Judiciary,
107th Cong. 11-14 (2001) [hereinafter Section 104 Report], available at http://
commdocs.house.gov/committees/j udiciary/hju76669.000/hju76669_0.htm
(statement of Howard L. Berman, Ranking Member, Subcomm. on Courts, the
1472 [Vol. 41:4
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to combat piracy of digital works, to advance electronic22
commerce, and to implement the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty.23 Among other things, the
DMCA proscribes the sale of devices that circumvent technologies
that effectively protect copyrighted works.24 In enacting the DMCA,
Congress reasoned that the prohibition on circumvention was an
important extension of the longstanding protection against
25
copyright infringement. Congress sought to maintain the balance
between the interests of copyright owners and consumers by
carving out "breathing space" for the fair use of copyrighted• 26
material. Commentators, however, were quick to note that the
DMCA expanded the scope of copyright protection and provided
copyright holders a substantial new control over the means of
distribution.27
B. Circumvention Liability Under § 1201 of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act
Section 1201 of the DMCA proscribes the circumvention of
21
technologies that effectively protect copyrighted content.
Circumvention is defined as the "descrambling, decrypting,
Internet, and Intellectual Property).
22. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT: A REPORT OF THE
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS PURSUANT TO § 104 OF THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT
ACT, at v (2001) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE REGISTER].
23. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 440 (2d Cir. 2001)
("The DMCA was enacted in 1998 to implement the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty which requires contracting parties to
'provide adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against the
circumvention of effective technological measures.., which are not authorized by
the authors concerned or permitted by law."' (quoting World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) Treaty, art. 11, Apr. 12, 1997, 21 U.S.T. 1749, 2186 U.N.T.S.
121)).
24. For further discussion of the DMCA's prohibition on circumvention, see
infra Part II.C.
25. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 12 (1998) ("The copyright law has long forbidden
copyright infringements, so no new prohibition was necessary.").
26. Corley, 273 F.3d at 443 n.13.
27. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach,
113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 519 (1999) (discussing the reach of the DMCA); Glynn S.
Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REv. 813, 819 (2001) (discussing technological
control over dissemination).
28. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2012).
14732015]
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avoiding, bypassing, removing, deactivating or impairing" of
technological protection measures (TPMs) through technological
means.29 Circumvention is often likened to "digital tresPass,30 and
circumvention technology is likened to a "skeleton key."'
Congress justified the prohibition against circumvention on
the grounds that it brought copyright infringement into the digital
era. Commentators have roundly rejected this assertion, finding
that circumvention liability represents "an unprecedented
departure" into the regulation of devices under the guise of
copyright law.3
There are two categories of circumvention liability under the
DMCA: "access control" and "copy control. '34 Access control
liability prohibits circumventing an access control TPM 35 as well as
trafficking in access control circumvention technology. 36 Whereas
copy control liability only prohibits trafficking technology that
circumvents a copy control TPM,37 the act of circumventing a copy
29. I.M.S. Inquiry Mgmt. Sys., Ltd. v. Berkshire Info. Sys., Inc., 307 F. Supp.
2d 521, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that circumvention does not occur when the
defendant has permission to "move through" the plaintiff's technological
protective measure).
30. See, e.g., Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178,
1196 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
31. See, e.g., Corley, 273 F.3d at 453-54 (likening circumvention software to a
skeleton key that can open a locked door, a combination that can open a safe, or a
device that can neutralize the security device attached to a store's products).
32. Accord Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1195; see S. REp. No. 105-190, at 12 (1998).
33. H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 24 (1998) (discussing a letter sent to
Congress signed by sixty-two copyright law professors expressing concern
regarding the regulation of devices in the name of copyright law); see also Robert
P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900-2000, 88
CALIF. L. Rrv. 2187, 2202 (2000) ("The protection of expression ... is for the first
time achieved through the regulation of devices.").
34. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a)-(b) (2012).
35. Id. § 1201(a)(1) ("No person shall circumvent a technological measure
that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title.").
36. Id. § 1201(a)(2) ("No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the
public, provide, or otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, device,
component, or part thereof, that-(A) is primarily designed or produced for the
purpose of circumventing a technological measure that effectively controls access
to a work protected under this title. .. ").
37. Id. § 1201(b)(1) ("No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the
public, provide, or otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, device,
component, or part thereof, that-(A) is primarily designed or produced for the
purpose of circumventing protection afforded by a technological measure that
1474 [Vol. 41:4
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control TPM is not itself prohibited under the DMCA.'
8 This is
because circumventing a copy control TPM is essentially copyright
infringement under § 106(1).'9 Because a single device ma 0
function as both an access control and a copy control TPM,
a single act of circumvention can violate both § 1201(a) and
§ 1201(b) 4 l
For liability to attach in a § 1201(a)(2) trafficking action, a
plaintiff
must prove: (1) ownership of a valid copyright on a work,
(2) [that is] effectively controlled by a technological
measure, which has been circumvented, (3) that third
parties can now access (4) without authorization, in a
manner that (5) infringes or facilitates infringing a right
protected by the Copyright Act, because of a product that
(6) the defendant either (i) designed or produced primarily
for circumvention; (ii) made available despite only limited
commercial significance other than circumvention; or
(iii) marketed for use in circumvention of the controlling
'12
technological measure.
effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under this title in a work or a
portion thereof ... ").
38. See Ticketmaster L.L.C. v. RMG Techs., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1112
(C.D. Cal. 2007) ("Sections 1201(a)(2) and 1201(b)(1) differ only in that
1201 (a) (2), by its terms, makes it wrongful to traffic in devices that circumvent
technological measures that control access to protected works, while 1201(b)(1) makes
it wrongful to traffic in devices that circumvent technological measures that protect
rights of a copyright owner in a work.").
39. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) ("[T he owner of copyright under this title has the
exclusive rights to ... reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords
."); S. REP. No. 105-190, at 12 (1998).
40. See, e.g., Apple, Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 673 F. Supp. 2d 931, 941-42 (N.D.
Cal. 2009) (finding a likely violation of both § 1201 (b) (1) and § 1201 (a) (2) when
a computer software's "access control" was circumvented and the program was
subsequently copied to the computer's RAM when the program was loaded), affd
in relevant part, 658 F.3d 1150, 1152 (9th Cir. 2011). See generally MAI Sys. Corp. v.
Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[I]t is generally accepted
that the loading of software into a computer constitutes the creation of a copy
under the Copyright Act.").
41. See 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d
1085, 1095 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
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Under § 1201, a technology's primary purpose is determined
by its function and not the creator's subjective intent." Further, a
TPM that is easily circumvented may still effectively control access
to a work." The circuits are split regarding whether a plaintiff must
establish a relationship between the alleged circumventing
technology and copyright infringement. 5 The Federal Circuit
holds that a § 1201 plaintiff must establish a "nexus to
infringement" between the circumvention technology at issue and
16the copyrighted material. The Ninth Circuit, however, requires no
such nexus.47 The circuits also disagree about whether a plaintiff
must show that the defendant lacked the copyright owner's
permission to circumvent." The Federal Circuit holds that a § 1201
plaintiff must show that the third party engaged in unauthorized
access of copyrighted content using the technology in question,49
whereas the Second Circuit holds that liability attaches whenever
50circumvention occurs.
43. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 457 (2d Cir. 2001)
(rejecting that intent to cause harm is required); Realnetworks, Inc. v. DVD Copy
Control Ass'n, 641 F. Supp. 2d 913, 939 (N.D. Cal. 2009) ("[T]here is no intent
element to the element of circumventing protection afforded by a technological
measure . . . ." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that motivation is
immaterial).
44. See Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522,
549 (6th Cir. 2004) (commenting that a TPM does not need to be "an impervious
shield" to effectively control access to a copyright-protected work); see also 321
Studios, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 1095 (stating that a TPM may still effectively protect
copyrighted work despite the availability of circumvention technology).
45. See United States v. Reichert, 747 F.3d 445, 458 (6th Cir. 2014) (Donald,
J., dissenting) ("[T]he circuit split is representative of an ongoing debate over
the . . . scope of the DMCA's anti-circumvention provision [regarding] whether
certain applications of § 1201 have undermined the delicate balance that Congress
sought to achieve between strengthening copyright law and preserving consumer
rights ... in our increasingly digitized culture.").
46. MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm't, Inc. 629 F.3d 928, 949 (9th Cir.
2010) (discussing the "nexus to infringement" requirement in the Federal Circuit
as found in Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1192-1203).
47. See id. (declining to adopt "nexus to infringement").
48. Id. at 953 n.16.
49. See Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1193.
50. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 443 (2d Cir. 2001);
accord United States v. Crippen, No. CR 09-703 PSG, 2010 WL 7198205, at *2
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2010) (citing Corley with approval).
1476 [Vol. 41:4
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The DMCA established several exceptions to circumvention
liability. First, the Act incorporated traditional defenses against
copyright infringement-such as fair use-into its statutory
framework. Second, the Act enumerated eight permissible types
of circumvention. "'2  Third, the Act charged the Library of
Congress5 to evaluate and create further statutory exemptions to
circumvention liability.54 Factors relevant to the Library of
Congress's inquiry include:
(1) the availability for use of copyrighted works; (2) the
availability for use of works for nonprofits archival,
preservation, and educational purposes; (3) the impact
that the prohibition on the circumvention of
technological measures applied to copyrighted works has
on criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching,
scholarship, or research; (4) the effect of circumvention
of technological measures on the market for or value of
copyrighted works; and (5) such other factors as the
Librarian considers appropriate.
The Library of Congress has shielded eight classes of
technology from circumvention liability 5 6 including read-aloud
software that assists disabled persons to read electronic works,
51. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c) (2012) ("Nothing in this section shall affect rights,
remedies, limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair
use....").
52. See id. § 1201(d)-U). The following entities are immunized from
circumvention liability: nonprofit libraries, archives, educational institutions, law
enforcement, intelligence, and other government security agencies. Id. Further,
circumvention liability does not attach when circumvention is undertaken for the
following purposes: reverse engineering, encryption research, protecting minors,
and protection of personally identifying information. Id.
53. See id. § 1201(a) (1) (C) ("[The Library of Congress acts] upon the
recommendation of the Register of Copyrights, who . . . consult[s] with the
Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information of the Department of
Commerce.").
54. Id. § 1201(a)(1)(B)-(C).
55. Id. § 1201 (a) (1) (C) (i)-(v). The constitutionality of this process has been
questioned on the grounds that the Librarian of Congress is not a member of the
executive branch and thus lacks requisite authority to make these
recommendations. See Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital
Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 519, 559 n.209 (1999).
56. See 37 C.F.R. § 201.40 (2014).
57. Id. § 201.40(b)(1).
14772015]
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computer programs that permit cellular telephones to be used on a
different wireless network,5s and technologies that circumvent DVD
Content Scrambling Systems when circumvention is necessary to
produce high-quality content required for educational purposes.
The DMCA affords few defenses for a defendant charged with6o.
trafficking circumvention technology. For example, fair use is not
a recognized defense against trafficking liability because
circumvention-not copyright infringement-is the punishable
offense.6' Of the enumerated exceptions, only the law enforcement,
reverse engineering, encryption research, and security testing apply
to the anti-trafficking provision. 62 Further, the exceptions adopted
by the Library of Congress are not applicable to a § 1204
defendant.63
58. Id. § 201.40(b) (3).
59. Id. § 201.40(b) (4).
60. "[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of
copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 107. Factors relevant to the determination of whether a
work was fairly used include:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as
a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work.
Id.
61. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 443 (2d Cir. 2001)
(noting that circumvention is a standalone offense); Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (observing that Congress
"deliberate[ly]" chose to exclude fair use as a defense); see also 321 Studios v.
Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1097-98 (N.D. Cal.
2004) (holding that permissible subsequent use does not negate trafficking
liability).
62. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (d)-(j). Justification for this rests upon Congress's
desire to "provide meaningful protection and enforcement of the copyright
owner's right to control access to his or her copyrighted work .... S. REP. No.
105-190, at 28-29 (1998).
63. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1) (E) ("Neither the exception under subparagraph
(B) from the applicability of the prohibition contained in subparagraph (A), nor
any determination made in a rulemaking conducted under subparagraph (C),
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C. Criminal Prosecution for Circumvention Under § 1204 of the Digital
Millenium Copyright Act
Section 1204 of the DMCA established criminal liability for
"[a]ny person who violates section 1201 or 1202 willfully and for
purposes of commercial advantage or private financial 
gain. ' 'e
Penalties are severe. A first time offense carries a maximum fine of
$500,000, five years imprisonment, or both.65 Subsequent offenses
carry a maximum fine of $1,000,000, ten years imprisonment, or66
both . In criminal copyright prosecution, civil copyright case law
has precedential value. This applies tojury instructions as well.""
For criminal liability to attach under § 1201 (a) (2) and § 1204
of the DMCA, the government must prove that the defendant:
(1) willfully (2) manufactured or trafficked in (3) a
technology, product, service, or part thereof (4) that
either: (a) is primarily designed or produced for the
purpose of (b) 'has only limited commercially significant
purpose or use other than' or (c) 'is marketed by that
person or another acting in concert with that person with
that person's knowledge for use in' (5) circumventing an
access control without authorization from the copyright
owner (6) for commercial advantage or private financial
gain. 69
Some commentators suggest that in its effort to deter digital
piracy of copyrighted works, the government will increasingly rely• . 70
on criminal prosecution for copyright infringement. There is
merit to this argument, especially when the infringer is civilly
64. Id. § 1204(a).
65. Id. § 1204(a) (1).
66. Id. § 1204(a) (2).
67. See United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1188 n.14 (9th Cir. 1977).
68. See United States v. Cross, 816 F.2d 297, 303 (7th Cir. 1987).
69. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES
253 (4th ed. 2013) [hereinafter PROSECUTING IP CRIMES] (quoting 17 U.S.C.
§ 1201(a)(2)) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 1204), available at http://www.justice.gov
/criminal/cybercrime/docs/prosecuting-ip crimesmanual_2013.pdf.
70. SeeJonathan Bick, Internet Copyright Infringement: An Emerging White-Collar
Crime Internet, BIcKLAW.cOM, www.bicklaw.com/Publications/InternetCopyright
Infringement.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2015) (hypothesizing that public policy will
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judgment-proof. To date, the United States has pursued relatively
few criminal prosecutions under § 1204.72 As of January 2015, a
Westlaw search produced eight § 1204 criminal proceedings.73 Of
these cases, only one is desiFnated as a published appellate
opinion: United States v. Reichert.
The lack of appellate case law and the relative complexity of
§§ 1201 and 1204 has produced confusion among the courts. For
example, in Reichert, the trial court all but ignored § 1204's mens
rea element when it issued a jury instruction that effectively made
the sale of circumvention technology a strict liability offense.7 5 On
appeal, the Sixth Circuit declined to construe the scope and reach
of the crime's mens rea. This sets dangerous precedent for future
§ 1204 prosecutions.
71. See Evan D. Brown, Online Copyright Infringement Presents Some Special Issues,
21 DUPAGE COUNTY B. Ass'N BRIEF 20, 22 (2008) ("judgment proof' infringer). See
generally Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetay Sanctions as
a Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1232, 1236-41 (1985) (stating that nonmonetary
sanctions may be a more effective deterrent than monetary sanctions under
certain economic conditions).
72. For a complete list of § 1204 prosecutions, see infra note 73.
73. See United States v. Reichert, 747 F.3d 445 (6th Cir. 2014); United States
v. Silvius, 559 F. App'x 490 (6th Cir. 2014); United States v. Wittich, Criminal
Action No. 14-35, 2014 WL 5113315 (E.D. La. Oct. 10, 2014); United States v.
Nosal, 930 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (N.D. Cal. 2013); United States v. Hucks, Criminal
Action No. 11-326, 2013 WL 654397 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 2013); United States v.
Xiang Li, Crim. No. 10-112-LPS-1, 2012 WL 5379102 (D. Del. Oct. 31, 2012);
United States v. Crippen, No. CR 09-703 PSG, 2010 WL 7198205 (C.D. Cal. Nov.
23, 2010); United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
74. 747 F.3d 445. The methodology used to conduct this study was as follows:
first, Author entered "17 U.S.C. 1204" into the Westlaw database; second, Author
selected the "Citing References" tab on Westlaw page that corresponded to the
statute; third, Author read each case contained within the "Citing References"
page to confirm that § 1204 was the dispositive issue.
75. Id. at 449-50; see also Proposed Jury Instruction at 2-3, United States v.
Reichert, No. 1:12 CR 177 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 18, 2013) (documenting the
defendant's proposed jury instnlctions).
76. Reichert, 747 F.3d at 451.
1480 [Vol. 41:4
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III. THE REICHERTDECISION
A. Facts and Procedure
JeffreyJ. Reichert operated a video game console modification
business. For a fee, Reichert modified game consoles to bypass the
781
device's TPM. When properly attached to the printed circuit
board, a modification chip circumvents the game console's TPMs.79
Manufacturers install TPMs to prevent the console from running
pirated or otherwise unauthorized games.80
Prior to his arrest, Reichert was an active contributor to an
online discussion forum dedicated to the topic of video game• . 81
console modification. The online discussion forum" served as a
virtual clubhouse where enthusiasts discussed various ways to
modify video game consoles.s3 Although only possessing a high
school diploma, Reichert was regarded among the forum members
as a capable video game console modifier. Reichert routinely5
advised members about the different types of modification chips,
where to obtain pirated video games, and how to conceal
modifications from console manufacturers. 6 Although some
members may have been unaware of the illegal nature of their
77. See id. at 448 (noting that federal agents seized, among other things,
"business cards advertising Reichert's services" when they raided his residence
where he also conducted business).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 449, 456.
80. See generally Phillip A. HarrisJr., Mod Chips and Homebrew: A Recipe for Their
Continued Use in the Wake of Sony v. Divineo, 9 N.C.J.L. & TECH. 113, 117 (2007)
(discussing how modification chips are used to enhance video game console
functionality and circumvent technological protection measures).
81. Reichert, 747 F.3d at 448.
82. See X-Box-SCENE, http://www.xbox-scene.com/modchips4_table.htm
(last updated Mar. 11, 2007) (providing technical specifications and other data on
various modification chips).
83. Reichert, 747 F.3d at 449.
84. Id. at 449, 454. Among members, Reichert was known as "the only person
... that knew there was another way... to modify a certain type of console." Id. at
449.
85. Id. at 449. In one such post, Reichert told a member of the forum that a
certain modification chip was "the best chip for sure," but warned the novice
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activities, Reichert posted a comment stating, "[wle aren't
technically supposed to do [installs]," but "no one cares.""'
Unbeknownst to Reichert, the forum had become the focus of
a joint Department of Homeland Security and Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) anti-piracy investigation, code named
18Operation Tangled Web. In 2007, an undercover ICE agent
contacted Reichert seeking to buy a modified Nintendo Wii.
9
Reichert agreed."0 Reichert purchased a Nintendo Wii, modified
the console, and sold the illicit device to the agent for a $50
profit." Thereafter, employees of Nintendo, Inc., serving as experts
for the United States, verified that the Wii had been successfully
"hard-modded with a Wii Key ood chip" and was capable of playing
92pirated video games.
Agents searched Reichert's residence and the garage of his
friend, Kevin Belcik, ' where they discovered modification chips, a
soldering iron, computers, and business cards advertising
Reichert's services. 94 Reichert admitted to agents that he "knew the
mod chips were in a gray area," but he did not believe that it was
illegal to sell and install the chips.
95
Reichert was subsequently charged under §§ 1201 (a) (2) (A)
and 1204(a) of the DMCA. 6 At trial, Jason Allen, an Internet piracy
87. Id.
88. Id. at 456.
89. Id. at 448. Nintendo Wii is a popular video game console that was
introduced by Nintendo Co., Ltd. in 2006. See Company History, NINTENDO, http://
www.nintendo.com/corp/history.jsp (last visited Apr. 24, 2015).
90. Reichert, 747 F.3d at 448.
91. Id.
92. See Exhibit A at 5, United States v. Reichert, No. 1:12 CR 177 (N.D. Ohio
Jan. 18, 2013). The modified Nintendo Wii successfully loaded and ran a pirated
version (i.e., an unauthorized copy) of Super Paper Mario (DVD-R format). See id.
Had the console's technological protection measures been functioning correctly,
the Wii would have produced an error message and prohibited game play when
the pirated game was placed in the device. See id.
93. Reichert, 747 F.3d at 448.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 449.
96. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(A) (2012) ("No person shall manufacture,
import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise traffic in any technology,
product, service, device, component, or part thereof, that is primarily designed or
produced for the purpose of circumventing a technological measure that
effectively controls access to a work protected tinder this title."); Reichert, 747 F.3d
at 448 (noting Reichert's charge and when "[c]ircumventing or trafficking in
1482 [Vol. 41:4
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specialist with Nintendo testified that the "'primary purpose"' of
modification chips [was] to enable a user to play pirated video
games."97 The witness then explained how the Wii video game
console would be disassembled and the modification chip soldered
to the device's circuit board.9 In the witness's opinion, the
modification process was a "'pretty complicated process,' given that
the modifier need [ed] to identify the proper locations to... attach
the wires and because holding a soldering iron . . . for too long
could damage the [circuit] board." ' Although evidence tended to
show "that Reichert did not knowingly order his modified chips
from an international source," Allen testified, "it is pretty well
known among the community that in the United States mod chips
without licenses are illegal."' 00
In his defense, Reichert argued that he believed that
modifying video game consoles was legally permissible.'01 Reichert's
sole witness, Kevin Belcik, testified that Reichert had received
instruction on building personal computers from a high school
vocational program. Belcik then attempted to testify that
modifying a video game console required the same basic
knowledge that Reichert had learned in the vocational program.'03
The court sustained the government's objection to this testimony
and further disallowed Belcik from stating whether Reichert
believed that modifying video game consoles was against the law."'
Over Reichert's objection, the district court adopted the
government's proposed deliberate ignorance jury instruction. 
5
The instruction stated that the jury "may find that [Reichert] knew
he was violating the Digital Millennium Copyright Act . .. [if he]
deliberately ignored a high probability that he was trafficking in
technology primarily designed to circumvent technological
circumvention tools in violation of § 1201 is a criminal offense" under § 1204(a)).
97. Reichert, 747 F.3d at 449; see also Brief of Appellee at 10, Reichert, 747 F.3d
445 (No. 13-3479), 2013 WL 3185706.
98. Reichert, 747 F.3d at 449.
99. Id.
100. Id.; see also Brief of Appellee, supra note 97, at 13.
101. Reichert, 747 F.3d at 452-53.
102. Id. at 449.
103. Id.
104. Id. Had Belcik testified, he would have stated that Reichert "believed that
modifying the hardware was legal .... Id.
105. Id. at 449-50.
14832015]
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measures designed to effectively control access to a work
copyrighted under federal law."' 10 6
In his proposed jury instructions, Reichert unpersuasively
argued that the deliberate ignorance instruction proposed by the
government was incorrect and instead should be replaced by a
willful standard, "meaning he knew he was violating the law."'0 7
Reichert also failed to persuade the district court that the jury
should have been instructed about the non-infringing ways
modifications chips are used.'°s
Before delivering its deliberate ignorance instruction, the
district court instructed the jury on willfulness, stating:
As used in these instructions, an act is done willfully if it is
done voluntarily and intentionally with the intent to do
something unlawfully, that is, with the intent either to
disobey or disregard the law. While a person must have
acted with the intent to do something the law forbids, the
person need not be aware of the specific law or the rule
his conduct is violating. Willfulness requires the
Government to prove that the law imposed a duty on the
Defendant, that the Defendant knew of this duty, and that
he voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty.'09
The district court then delivered its deliberate ignorance
instruction, which stated, in relevant part:
If you are convinced that the Defendant deliberately
ignored a high probability that he was trafficking in
technology primarily designed to circumvent
technological measures designed to effectively control
access to a work copyrighted under federal law, then you
106. Id.
107. Proposed Jury Instruction, supra note 75, at 2-3.
108. Id. at 3-5. Reichert correctly noted that the owner of a computer
program may legally copy that program for archival purposes provided that the
copy is destroyed should the holder lose the right to possess the original version.
See Brief of Appellant at 5-7, Reichert, 747 F.3d 445 (No. 13-3479), 2013 WL
2470411, at *5-7. Additionally, Reichert correctly stated that a rightful owner of
software purchased legally from another region might be using a lawfully installed
modification chip to circumvent that software's technological protective measures.
See id.
109. Reichert, 747 F.3d at 450.
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may find that he knew he was violating the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act."'
Reichert was convicted for violating §§ 1201(a) (2) (A) and
1204(a) of the DMCA.' Over objection, Reichert's sentence was
increased on the grounds that his "crime was facilitated by his
possession of technical computer skills 'not . . . possessed by
members of the general public.""' 12 Although the district court
noted that Reichert was "getting a tough deal," it denied his motion
for a reduced sentence."v Reichert was sentenced to twelve months
and one day of imprisonment."
4 An appeal followed. 1
5
B. The Holding
The Sixth Circuit addressed three fundamental issues in
Reichert."' The first issue was whether the deliberate ignorance jury
instruction negated § 1204(a)'s willful mens rea element." 7 The
second issue was whether the exclusion of Belcik's testimony
violated Reichert's constitutional right to present a defense."
1 8 The
third issue was whether the district court erred in applying the
special skills enhancement to Reichert's sentence.119
For criminal liability to attach under § 1204(a), the
government must show that the accused acted "willfully and for
purposes of commercial advantage or private 
financial gain."'
120
Reichert conceded that a showing of willful blindness would satisfy
the crime's mens rea.'1' However, Reichert argued that the
deliberate ignorance instruction "eviscerated" § 1204(a)'s mens rea
element "by allowing the jury to convict him upon finding only that
he [deliberately ignored a high probability] that he was trafficking
110. Id.
111. Id.; see also United States v. Reichert, No. 1:12 CR 177 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 18,
2013), affd, 747 F.3d 445.
112. Reichert, 747 F.3d at 450.
113. Id.; see also United States v. Reichert, No. 1:12 CR 177 (N.D. Ohio Apr.
10, 2013) (memorandum opinion and order denying defendant's motion to
impose alternative sentence) (describing sentencing in detail).
114. Reichert, 747 F.3d at 450.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 447.
117. Id. at 451.
118. Id. at 453.
119. Id. at 454.
120. 17 U.S.C. § 1204(a) (2012).
121. Reichert, 747 F.3d at 451-52.
14852015]
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in circumvention technology, rather than [a finding that] he knew
that he was violating the law by trafficking in [circumvention]
technology. ' Reichert did not challenge the jury's findings."'
The court acknowledged that § 1204(a)'s mens rea element
was a matter of first impression, but it declined to interpret its
124scope. Instead, the court held "that a defendant need not be
aware of the specific provision of law that his conduct violates, as
long as he is aware that his act is illegal."'' The court reasoned that
because the instruction was "sandwiched" 26 in between clarifying
language, the deliberate ignorance principles were "substantially
covered" and the crime's mens rea requirement remained intact.
2
The court dispensed with Reichert's argument that "the
instruction failed to properly reflect that a defendant is willfully
blind only if he took 'deliberate action' to avoid actual knowledge"
on the grounds that the language was taken from a pattern jury
instruction that has "repeatedly" been upheld.' The court held
that although "mildly imprecise," "when viewed 'as a whole,' the
jury instructions .. .properly instructed the jury on the issue of
willfulness."'2 9 The court speculated that the jury had found
Reichert acted willfully because he stated that he was operating in a
"'gray' area of the law."'"3
The court also rejected that the exclusion of Belcik's testimony
violated Reichert's constitutional right to present a defense.' The
exclusion of evidence offends the Constitution when done
arbitrarily or disproportionately.' The court found that the
proffered testimony "had only marginal relevance to whether
122. Id. at 451 (emphasis added).
123. Id. at 453.
124. Id. at 451.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 452.
127. Id. at 453 n.2.
128. Id. at 451. See generally KEIN F. O'MALLEYJAY E. GRENIG & WILLIAM C. LEE,
FEDERAL JURY PRAcTICE AND INsTRUcTIONS § 17:09 (6th ed. 2006) (discussing the
Sixth Circuit's "repeated[] approv[al]" of the Sixth Circuit Pattern Criminal Jury
Instruction on "deliberate ignorance").
129. Reichert, 747 F.3d at 452 (quoting United States v. Ross, 502 F.3d 521, 527
(6th Cir. 2007)).
130. Id. at 452-53.
131. Id. at 454.
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Reichert believed .. .that his conduct was legal" because Belcik
had been away during the time in question.
Finally, the court was unmoved by Reichert's argument that
special skills sentencing enhancement was improper."' Citing
Reichert's half-decade of experience modifying consoles, his
adeptness with a soldering iron, and his reputation in the game
modification community, the court found that Reichert possessed
requisite "special skills" to warrant the sentencing 
enhancement.
1 3
Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit upheld Reichert's conviction and
sentence.
C. The Dissent
Judge Bernice Donald issued the court's dissenting 
opinion.13 7
Citing the numerous statutory exceptions to circumvention liability,
§ 1201's legislative history, 38  and subsequent congressional
action, 3 19 Judge Donald found that Reichert's appeal must be
analyzed through the lens of the modification chip's uncertain
legal standing. Judge Donald determined that for criminal
133. Id. at 454.
134. Id. at 454-55.
135. Id. at 448-49, 455. In its determination, the court relied heavily on
testimony provided by the prosecution's expert witness-an employee of Nintendo
Ltd.-who stated, among other things, that the "modification of a game system
can be a pretty complicated process." Id. at 455 (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Exhibit A, supra note 92, at 7.
136. Reichert, 747 F.3d at 455.
137. Id. (Donald,J, dissenting).
138. Id. at 460 (citing Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of
Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, 65 Fed. Reg.
64,556, 64,570 (Oct. 27, 2000) (codified at 37 C.F.R. § 201)) ("[T]he Librarian of
Congress considered, but ultimately declined to create an exemption for
mod[ification] chips . . . based on its reasoning that § 1201(0 was sufficient to
safeguard against legitimate users of mod[ification] chips . . . from adverse
action.").
139. See id. at 460 n.3. At the time the Sixth Circuit heard Reichert's case,
there were two bills presented to Congress that would alter the Act's "framework"
by, among other things, requiring a nexus to infringement. Id. (citing Unlocking
Consumer Choice and Wireless Competition Act, H.R. 1123, 113th Cong. (2014);
Unlocking Technology Act of 2013, H.R. 1892, 113th Cong. (2013)). However,
these bills have not been passed into law.
140. Reichert, 747 F.3d at 460 (Donald,J., dissenting).
14872015]
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liability to attach under § 1204, the defendant must know that
selling modified video game consoles is illegal.141
Under this standard, the instruction should have stated that
Reichert willingly violated § 1201 if he "deliberately ignored a high
probability that he was breaking [a] law designed to effectively
control access to a work copyrighted under federal law" as opposed
to "deliberately ignored a high probability that he was trafficking in
technology primarily designed to circumvent technological measures
designed to effectively control access to a work copyrighted under
federal law."'
4 2
Judge Donald found that the instruction given by the trial
court "directly undermined Reichert's only defense" and
"permitted the jury to deliver a guilty verdict upon a lesser finding
than the statue's willfulness requirement."'' 13 The judge rejected the
majority's position that the deficient portion of the instruction was
cured because it was "sandwiched between two proper statements
of the law. ' Because the court could "do no more than guess at
what the jury might have done . . . [if] 4properly instructed," the
instruction constituted a reversible error.
Finding that § 1204's mens rea requirement was "arguably
open to various interpretations,"Judge Donald argued that the rule
of lenity should apply. "" This doctrine, which requires criminal
statutes to "provide fair warning," mandated that the Government
conclusively establish that Reichert acted with the requisite mens
rea. 147 Judge Donald found that the deliberate ignorance jury
instruction improperly "convoluted the scienter element of the
charge and aggravated the already heightened risk of error
stemming from a statute that was itself' ambiguous and
impermissible. 141
Citing the "overwhelming evidence" that established Reichert's
defense, "the ongoing debate over the scope of the DMCA's anti-
141. Id. at 461 (citing Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 192 (1998))
("[IT] he Government must prove that the defendant acted with knowledge that his
conduct was unlawful.").
142. Id.
143. Id. at 462 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 1204 (2012)).
144. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
145. Id. (quoting Davis v. Georgia, 451 U.S. 921, 922-23 (1981)).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 462-63 (quoting Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427-28
(1985)).
148. Id. at 463.
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circumvention provision," and contemporary legal scholarship,
Judge Donald found that had the jury received the correct
deliberate ignorance instruction, it would have been "highly
improbable" that Reichert would have been convicted.' 9
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Establishing Liability for Trafficking Circumvention Technology
The majority held that the jury instruction, "viewed 'as a
whole,"' sufficiently conveyed § 1204's willfulness requirement
because the contested portion of the instruction was "sandwiched
between" passages that properly stated the crime's 
mens rea.150
Accordingly, the court upheld Reichert's conviction.15' Although
Reichert purported to have avoided interpreting the scope of
§ 1204(a)'s mens rea element, 52 it is useful to analyze the case and
evaluate its likely impact on future §§ 1201 (a) (2) (a) and 1204
prosecutions.
1. Jury Instruction
The district court instructed the jury to deliver a guilty verdict
if Reichert "deliberately ignored a high probability that he was
trafficking in technology primarily designed to circumvent
technological measures designed to effectively control access to a
work copyrighted under federal law."1
53
This instruction was flawed because it unnecessarily conflated
the issue of trafficking circumvention technology with the
technology's primary purpose. In one sentence, the instruction
asked the jury to determine whether Reichert was "trafficking in [a]
technology" and if that technology was "primarily designed to
circumvent" TPMs that effectively protect copyrighted work.'15 The
instruction was defective because an affirmative response to
trafficking may have dictated an affirmative finding that the
modification chip was primarily designed for circumvention
purposes. Said another way, if Reichert sold a modification chip,
149. Id. at 463-64.
150. Id. at 452 (majority opinion).
151. Id. at 455.
152. Id. at 451.
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then it must have been the case that the modification chip was
primarily designed for circumvention. This is undesirable because
it fails to adequately address the crime's mens rea element.
A more prudent course would be to divide the instruction into
a three-prong test. This test would proceed as follows: (1) Did the
defendant traffic in a technology? (2) Is the trafficking technology
primarily designed to circumvent technological measures that
effectively control access to a work? (3) Did the defendant know or
deliberately ignore a high probability that the trafficked technology
was primarily designed for circumvention purposes? This
instruction properly conveys the crime's mens rea and more clearly
states its constituent elements.
2. Civil Liability Under § 1201(a)(2)(A)
Liability attaches tinder § 1201 (a) (2) (A) if and only if the
technology at issue "is primarily designed or produced for the
purpose of circumventing a [TPM] that effectively controls access
to a [copyrighted] work.'' 55 Liability does not attach if the
technology is merely capable of circumventing a TPM. 56 The
determination of a technology's primary purpose is a matter of fact
to be submitted to the jury. Expert witness testimony likely will be
required.15
In Reichert, the government presented evidence that the
modification chip at issue was capable of bypassing a "game
console's security measures. ' ' 5 ) Further, "the government's expert
155. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a)(2) (A) (2012).
156. See 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d
1085, 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (discussing the primary purpose requirement); see also
United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1125 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
(discussing permissible circumvention to engage in "fair use").
157. 321 Studios, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 1098 ("With regard to the second prong of
both § 1201 (a) (2) and § 1201 (b) (1), it is impossible for this Court to determine
on summary judgment whether [the technology] has only limited commercially
significant purposes other than circumvention, as this is a question of fact for a
jury to decide, and neither party has produced significant evidence on this
issue.").
158. See Realnetworks, Inc. v. DVD Copy Control Ass'n, 641 F. Supp. 2d 913,
941, 950 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (discussing the use of expert witness testimony in the
"substantial noninfringing use" standard).
159. Reichert, 747 F.3d at 449; see also United States' Response to Defendant's
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witness testified that the primary purpose of modification chips is
to enable a user to play pirated video games.", 60 Reichert did not
present contrary expert witness testimony. 61 Accordingly, it is
reasonable to conclude that the jury found that the modification
chip that Reichert sold had the primary purpose of circumventing a
TPM that controls access to the video game console.')'
Future defendants should not repeat this mistake. A § 1201 (a)
defendant should go to great lengths to introduce evidence that
shows non-circumventing uses for the technology at issue.
Additionally, § 1204 defendants should urge that the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard be used when determining a
technology's primary purpose. Success at this stage should
immunize the defendant from criminal and civil liability.
3. Criminal Liability Under § 1204(a)
Section 1204(a) provides criminal liability for willfully
trafficking circumvention technology. 16' Under § 1204(a), criminal
liability attaches if and only if the government proves that the
defendant "willfully and for purposes of commercial advantage or
private financial gain" violated § 1201 (e.g., sold a technology that
is primarily used for circumvention).66
Because the legal status of the technology is a matter of fact,'
the government needs to prove that a § 1204 defendant knew that
he was trafficking in a technology and that the technology's
primary purpose is to circumvent TPMs. 16' Courts should not
160. Reichert, 747 F.3d at 449 (internal quotation marks omitted).
161. United States' Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of "Fair Use" and
Reference to "Legal" Uses for Mod Chips Under Federal Rules of Evidence 401,
402, 403, and 702, at 3-4, Reichert, No. 1:12 CR 177.
162. See Reichert, 747 F.3d at 449-50.
163. See generally id. at 459 n.2. ("[I]nstalling a mod chip into a console like
the Wii for the purpose of enhancing its functionality, so that it can play ordinary
and lawfully purchased DVDs, would also seem to fall under the reverse
engineering exception at § 1201(f), so long as such a modification was not
designed primarily . . .for the purpose of playing illegal, pirated video games."
(internal quotation marks omitted)) .
164. See 17 U.S.C. § 1204(a) (2012).
165. Id.
166. 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085,
1098 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (finding that a technology's commercially significant
purpose is a "question of fact for the jury to decide").
167. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (2) (A) (stating the primary purpose requirement).
14912015]
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interpret § 1204 to merely require that a defendant willingly sold a
circumvention technology. This would undermine Congress's
intent and make the distinction between civil and criminal liability
practically nonexistent.'5 For criminal liability to attach, it must
be shown beyond a reasonable doubt that a § 1204 defendant:S • 169
(1) trafficked in a technology, (2) whose primary purpose is to
circumvent a technological measure that effectively protects access
to a copyrighted work,"7 and (3) the defendant knew or was
willfully blind to the technology's primary purpose."'
The way in which a subsequent purchaser uses the technology
is not relevant to a § 1204 inquiry. Once the government has
demonstrated that the defendant sold a technology whose primary
purpose is to circumvent a TPM, evidence of subsequent non-
infringing use is not a defense.173 Nonetheless, subsequent non-
infringing use may be relevant to demonstrate that a defendant was
not aware of the technology's primary purpose. This would negate
the crime's willful act requirement. However, civil liability may still
attach under § 1201 (a) (2) (A). 174 The effectiveness of this approach
has yet to be determined.
The government produced two pieces of evidence that
addressed Reichert's knowledge of the modification chip's primary
purpose. The first was an Internet post in which Reichert stated,
"[w]e aren't technically supposed to do [installs]," but "no one
168. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 441 (2d Cir. 2001)
("The DMCA creates civil remedies and criminal sanctions." (citations omitted));
see also H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 26 (1998) ("The Committee has endeavored
to specify, with as much clarity as possible, how the right against anti-
circumvention would be qualified to maintain balance between the interests of
content creators and information users.").
169. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (2).
170. Id. § 1201(a) (2) (A).
171. Id. § 1204.
172. See, e.g., 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp.
2d 1085, 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
173. See MGE UPS Sys., Inc. v. GE Consumer & Indus., Inc., 622 F.3d 361, 366
(5th Cir. 2010) (citing Corey with approval); see also Corley, 273 F.3d at 443 ("[T]he
DMCA . . . does not concern itself with the use of those materials after
circumvention has occurred." (citations omitted)). But see Chamberlain Grp., Inc.
v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("[T]he DMCA
emphatically did not 'fundamentally alter' the legal landscape governing the
reasonable expectations of consumers or competitors ....").
174. This is because § 1201(a)(2)(A) does not impose a "willfulness"
requirement. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (2) (A).
1492 [Vol. 41:4
23
Abdo: Keeping Princess Peach Locked in Her Castle: Criminal Liability f
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2015
UNITED STATES V. REICHERT
cares."' 75 The second was Reichert's admission to the arresting
agents that he "knew the mod chips were in 
a gray area."176
Reichert's only witness, Kevin Belcik, was prevented from testifying
about whether Reichert believed that his conduct was illegal.'
From the evidence presented, it is reasonable to conclude that the
jury believed that Reichert knew that the modification chip was
primarily used to circumvent copyright protection.
The dissent argued that the deliberate ignorance instruction
constituted a reversible error because it "directly undermined
Reichert's only defense at trial" and negated the statute's mens rea
element. 78 The dissent contended that the jury instruction should
have asked whether Reichert "deliberately ignored a high
probability that he was breaking the law designed to effectively
control access to a work copyrighted under federal 
law." 179
The dissent's conclusion is flawed. Notwithstanding the bar on
Kevin Belcik's testimony, Reichert conceded that "the record [was]
replete with evidence that . . . Reichert was operating under the
belief that his conduct was lawful."'"" Further, the dissent's
proposed instruction ignores the primary purpose standard
mandated by the DMCA."s As discussed above, subsequent non-
infringement is irrelevant once the government has established
that the primary purpose of the technology is to circumvent a
technological measure that effectively protects a copyrighted work
and the defendant is aware of this.' s2
175. United States v. Reichert, 747 F.3d 445, 449 (6th Cir. 2014).
176. Id.
177. Id.; see also Brief of Appellant, supra note 108, at 13 ("The defense
attempted to introduce Mr. Reichert's statements that he believed that modifying
game console hardware was permissible under federal copyright law, but that
copying and selling copied game was not.").
178. Reichert, 747 F.3d at 462 (Donald, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 461 (emphasis omitted).
180. Brief of Appellant, supra note 108, at 24.
181. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2) (A) (2012) ("No person shall ... traffic in any
technology . . . that . . . is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of
circumventing a technological measure that effectively controls access to a
[copyrighted] work ... ").
182. For a discussion of circumvention as its own cause of action separate and
apart from copyright infringement, see Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273
F.3d 429, 443 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that circumvention is a standalone offense);
321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1097
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B. Consumer Rights
The DMCA has been a lightning rod in copyright law. Prior to
its enactment, politicians, academicians, and members of the
content industries debated the merits of circumvention liability."'
To be sure, scholars have spilled much ink criticizing the DMCA
and its circumvention provisions. 4 Since its enactment, the U.S.
Copyright Office, pursuant to statutory mandate, has solicited
public comments from interested parties regarding the effects and
effectiveness of circumvention liability.18 5 Consumers have been
largely excluded from this discussion despite the DMCA's mandate,,186,
to "promote electronic commerce. This is ironic, of course,
because commerce cannot exist without consumers. Consumers are
not without recourse, however. Section 1201 (c) of the DMCA states
that "[n]othing in this section shall affect rights, remedies,
limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement .... "'8'
Therefore, consumers may seek to attack the DMCA's anti-
circumvention provisions using the first sale doctrine.""'
183. See, e.g., WHITE PAPER, supra note 19, at 231-33 (discussing fair use and
circumvention liability).
184. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment
Constraints on the Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 354, 421 (1999)
("The anticircumvention provision is based on the premise that it is worthwhile to
make many users lose some privileged uses in order to assure that the owners of
copyrighted materials can more completely capture the value of their products.");
June M. Besek, Anti-Circumvention Laws and Copyright: A Report from the Kernochan
Center for Law, Media and the Arts, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 385, 393-94 (2004)
("[A]nti-circumvention legislation . . . prevents legitimate uses of copyrighted
works."); David Nimmer, A Rfiff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,
148 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 674-75 (2000) (characterizing the DMCA as a "radical
change[]" in copyright law); Samuelson, supra note 55, at 534 ("DMCA's
overbroad anti-circumvention provisions are neither consistent with framework
principles nor good for the new economy.").
185. See, e.g., Section 104 Report, supra note 21, at 27-32 (summarizing the
broad range of views solicited from the public on the anti-circumvention
provisions included in the DMCA); Memorandum from Marybeth Peters, Register
of Copyrights, to James H. Billington, Library of Congress 20-21 (Oct. 27, 2003),
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/docs/registers-recommendation.pdf (discussing
the process whereby the opinions of interested parties are solicited pursuant to 17
U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (1) (C)'s Notice of Inquiry).
186. REPORT OF THE REGISTER, supra note 22, at vi.
187. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (c) (2012).
188. See id. § 109.
1494 [Vol. 41:4
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Video game developers use "regional encoding"-also referred
to as Digital Rights Management-to prohibit users from playing
games in regions that differ from where the game console was
sold."s9 For example, a PlayStation video game console purchased
in the United States may not run a PlayStation video game
purchased in Japan even though the game and game console
would otherwise be compatible. '9 This practice is antagonistic to a
consumer's right to alienate her property as protected by the first
sale doctrine.
The first sale doctrine establishes that once a copy of a work is
lawfully sold, the copyright owner cannot control subsequent
transfers of that particular work.'9 ' The rationale behind the first
sale doctrine is "that ownership of the material object ... is distinct
from ownership of the intellectual property.1
9 2
Conceived at common law, 93 the first sale doctrine has deep
roots in American jurisprudence. 94 The United States Supreme
189. See DerekJ. Schaffner, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act: Overextension of
Copyright Protection and the Unintended Chilling Effects on Fair Use, Free Speech, and
Innovation, 14 CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'Y 145, 163 (2004).
190. See, e.g., Sony Computer Entm't Am., Inc. v. Gamemasters, 87 F. Supp. 2d
976, 981 (N.D. Cal. 1999) ("Games not licensed for distribution in the same
territory as that of the console's sale cannot be played on the PlayStation [console]
without a device such as the Game Enhancer." (citations omitted)).
191. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) ("[T]he owner of a particular copy or
phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such
owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or
otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord."); see also United
States v. Moore, 604 F.2d 1228, 1232 (9th Cir. 1979); 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER
& DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.11 (Matthew Bender ed., rev. ed.
2014) (discussing the first sale doctrine and its burden of proof).
192. 4WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRYON COPYRIGHT § 13:15 (2014).
193. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1363 (2013) ("The
'first sale' doctrine is a common-law doctrine with an impeccable historic
pedigree." (citing I E. COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND § 360, at 223
(1628))).
194. For an early example of the common law first sale doctrine imported into
copyright law, see Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201, 206-07 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853).
Before publication [the author] has the exclusive possession of his
invention. His dominion is perfect. But when he has published his
book.., he can have no longer an exclusive possession of [it] .... The
author's conceptions have become the common property of his
readers .... When he has sold his book, the only property which be
reserves to himself, or which the law gives to him, is the exclusive right
to multiply the copies of that particular combination of characters
14952015]
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Court first approved the doctrine at the turn of the twentieth
century.19 5 The Court affirmed the international scope of the first
sale doctrine by holding that the doctrine applies to work
manufactured and purchased both domestically and abroad. 96
Iterations of the doctrine have been codified in the various
Copyright Acts.'97 The doctrine's international analog, the doctrine
of exhaustion, is widely recognized-although not without
controversy-by foreign jurisdictions.' Proponents of
international exhaustion argue that the doctrine advances notions
of free trade and benefits consumers.'99 Opponents argue that the
doctrine limits a copyright holder's ability to maximize her profits
by inhibiting "territorial licenses. 2 °°
211Although not raised in Reichert , the first sale doctrine
presents a potentially powerful shield against circumvention
which exhibits to the eyes of another the ideas intended to be
conveyed.
Id.
195. See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 349-51 (1908) (holding that
an author's exclusive statutory right to "vend" was extinguished after the first sale
of the work).
196. See Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1358 (holding that the first sale doctrine
applies to works manufactured abroad, purchased abroad, and subsequently
imported into the United States); Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L'anza Research
Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 152 (1998) (holding that the first sale doctrine applies to
works manufactured in the United States, purchased abroad, and subsequently
imported into the United States). But see Damien Riehl &Jumi Kassim, Is "Buying"
Digital Content Just "Renting" for Life? Contemplating a Digital First-Sale Doctrine, 40
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 783, 787 (2014) (discussing how content industries use
contracts to limit the first sale doctrine).
197. See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 191, § 8.12. For the current statutory
iteration of the first sale doctrine, see 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012).
198. See generally Vincent Chiappetta, The Desirability of Agreeing to Disagree: The
WTO, TRIPS, International IPR Exhaustion and a Few Other Things, 21 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 333, 340-43 (2000) (discussing the mechanics of international exhaustion).
199. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two
Achievements of the Uruguay Round: Putting Trips and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA.
J. INT'LL. 275, 333 n.12 (1997).
200. See S. Zubin Gautam, The Murky Waters of First Sale Price Discrimination and
Downstream Control in the Wake ofKirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 29 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 717, 737-48 (2014) (discussing "the first sale doctrine's crippling
effects" on territorial licensing).
201. Judge Donald did cite several relevant articles that address the first sale
doctrine; however, neither Reichert nor Judge Donald squarely addressed the
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liability. °2 Under a geographically neutral interpretation of the first
sale doctrine, circumventing regional encoding to play a video
game lawfully made and legally obtained abroad may not constitute
203
copyright infringement. A prosecutor will likely argue that the
first sale doctrine is irrelevant because the act of circumvention is
itself proscribed.2 4 A § 1201(a)(2) defendant should rebut this
claim by asserting that first sale can defeat the primary purpose
element of the offense.2°5 Accordingly, a § 1201 (a) (2) defendant
may introduce evidence that the circumvention technology at issue
is used to defeat regional encoding in a manner that is consistent
206,
with a geographically neutral first sale doctrine. If the defendant
is in a jurisdiction that does not require a nexus to infringement,
such as the Ninth Circuit, this argument becomes less persuasive.
Additionally, a § 1201 (a) (2) defendant can aver that the
circumvention technology at issue merely allows the user to retain
the degree of control that she would otherwise have under the
Copyright Act-namely, the right of ownership afforded under the
first sale doctrine.207 The geographically neutral interpretation of
208
the first sale doctrine lends further credence to this argument.
Opponents may attempt to refute this argument on the grounds
202. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1) ("Nothing in this section shall affect rights,
remedies, limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use,
under this title."). See generally Besek, supra note 184, at 473 ("The first sale
doctrine is . . .potentially implicated when a work is distributed in a physical
medium but its use is limited to certain specific machines."); Lydia Pallas Loren,
Digitization, Commodification, Criminalization: The Evolution of Criminal Copyright
Infringement and the Importance of the Willfulness Requirement, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 835,
865 (1999) (stating that when a defendant asserts a first sale defense to a criminal
charge, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the first sale
doctrine is a viable defense). But see Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1116
(9th Cir. 2010) (holding that a licensee who never obtained ownership may not
invoke the first sale defense because ownership was never conveyed).
203. See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1371 (2013).
Kirtsaeng's holding extends to all copyrightable works, including video games. See
id. at 1360.
204. See PROSECUTING IP CRIMES, supra note 69, at 66-67.
205. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (2) (a) (stating the primary purpose requirement).
206. This scenario is not that dissimilar from the facts of Kirtsaeng, in which
textbooks were purchased in Thailand, imported into the United States, and
resold to American customers. See Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1356.
207. See 17 U.S.C. § 109.
208. Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1364-68 (listing the "parade of horribles" that
would result from a geographical interpretation of the first sale doctrine).
149720151
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that the DMCA's prohibition on circumvention is separate and
apart from copyright infringement. This attempt should fail if the
defendant can show that (1) the copy was lawfully made2 0 and (2)
was legally purchased and not merely rented. 21 This argument is
less applicable to negate trafficking liability because it does little to
negate the crime's mens rea.
A §§ 1201 (a) (2) and 1204(a) defendant may also argue that
the first sale doctrine limits a copyright holder's right. Courts hold
that affirmative defenses to copyright infringement do not
immunize circumvention liability on the grounds that the act of
circumvention, not infringement, is the proscribed offense. 212 If
first sale is not an affirmative defense, but rather a limitation on the
exclusive rights enjoyed by the copyright owner, then the scope of
the DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions should retrench. As
such, American and international copyright law suggest that uses
otherwise permissible under the first sale doctrine do not offend
anti-circumvention laws.213
V. CONCLUSION
It is often said that hard cases make bad law. In Reichert, the
converse of this maxim appears to be true. In an effort to combat
piracy of digital works, Congress enacted legislation that made the
otherwise benign act of enhancing a video game console's
209. See PROSECUTING IP CRIMES, supra note 69, at 67-68.
210. See United States v. Moore, 604 F.2d 1228, 1232 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding
that the copy in question must be "unauthorized" to avoid the first sale question).
211. See United States v. Drebin, 557 F.2d 1316, 1326-27 (9th Cir. 1977)
(stating that a sale must have occurred to trigger first sale doctrine).
212. See, e.g., Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc., 381 F.3d
1178, 1192-93 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that circumvention creates a new cause of
action). But see 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d
1085, 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2004) ("'Congress did not prohibit the act of circumvention
because it sought to preserve the fair use rights of persons who had lawfully
acquired a work.'" (quoting United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111,
1120 (N.D. Cal. 2002))).
213. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 440 (2d Cir. 2001)
("The DMCA was enacted in 1998 to implement the World Intellectual Property
Organization Copyright Treaty, which requires contracting parties to 'provide
adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against the circumvention
of effective technological measures . . . which are not authorized by the authors
concerned or permitted by law."' (emphasis added) (quoting World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty, supra note 23, art. II.)).
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functionality a criminal offense. Yet, before criminal liability may
attach, the government must meet the heavy burden of showing
that the accused acted willfully. No doubt, this high degree of
culpability is desirable given the statute's ambiguous language and
the severity of its sanctions.
Unfortunately, Reichert's uncritical interpretation of the
crime's mens rea requirement produced a criminal statute that far
exceeds the Act's purpose and intent. Reichert has taken the
DMCA's prohibition on trafficking circumvention technology one-
step closer to strict liability crime. This will likely diminish
consumer rights and obstruct the Act's intent to promote
commerce. To avoid this undesirable outcome, courts should look
critically upon Reichert and take due care to maintain the crime's
willful mens rea.
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